Yenting Lee is a Senior Threat Researcher at TXOne Networks, blending experience in ICS/SCADA, cyber offensive and defensive exercises, penetration testing, honeypots, and image processing. He has spoken at several conferences, including Black Hat MEA, FIRST Conference, ICS Cyber Security Conference USA, ISC Copenenhagen, CYBERSEC, SECCON, and PPAM India. Additionally, he has contributed several white papers and identified vulnerabilities related to ICS.
As global semiconductor equipment sales continue to reach record highs, the industry has become a target for threat actors. To enable automated data transfer between different equipment, almost all advance semiconductor fabrications follow to the SECS/GEM standard. However, since this standard was not preliminarily designed with cybersecurity, it's difficult for fabrications to mitigate cyber threats through a single solution.
Although the SECS/GEM standard is crucial for advance semiconductor fabrications, there has yet to be a comprehensive threat study based on the SECS/GEM standard. Therefore, this research will explore the SECS/GEM standard and its communication protocols. When advance fabrications face cyberattacks, it directly impacts global chip production and cycles. To mitigate the threats posed by threat actors to the semiconductor industry, this talk will also analyze the cybersecurity standards for semiconductor fabrications and provide recommendations for protection strategies.
As the cost-effectiveness of space technology increases, satellite networks are no longer exclusively used for scientific or military purposes. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite technology is now more commonly used in OT environments for both private and government sectors. However, in 2024, global concerns over the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict have resulted in a surge of aggressive attacks driven by geopolitical factors, with satellite networks becoming key targets influencing the outcome of these conflicts. The attack theories of the past are now practicing in reality.
This research studies the structure of the space industry. Due to performance limitations and specific development needs, the space industry faces attacks that are difficult to defend directly. In addition to explaining these attacks through the ongoing APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) war, this talk aims to mitigate the impact on satellite users' OT environments. This research collects security principles related to satellite networks from the U.S., Europe, and Japan in recent years. From this, we have derived objective principles applicable to satellite network users.
The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) is a legal framework in the EU aimed at descripting cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements within its region. As of 2026, relevant product manufacturers will be required to comply with reporting obligations. These rules are mandatory, and non-compliance will result in substantial fines. This talk will share how our PSIRT Team is preparing to comply with this act and turn it into a security defense barrier.
In this talk, we will summarize the regulations, which exceed 100 provisions, into categories such as development and production requirements, vulnerability management requirements, market sales rules, and market supervision regulations. We will highlight special provisions and commonly overlooked aspects. We will also explain how our PSIRT Team ensures that these regulations are under control. For example, the CRA has reporting obligations. When manufacturers encounter severe incident or discover actively exploited vulnerabilities, they must provide designated information to the EU within specified timeframes. We will share how the PSIRT Team has established a process to address this.
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